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THE PLACE OF CORPORATE 
LAWMAKING IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
Fenner Stewart, Jr.* 
I. Introduction 
he concept of “embeddedness” can be traced to Karl 
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation.1 The book is a history 
of the commoditization of English society from the eighteenth 
century forward, recounting how markets became unstitched 
from the fabric of society. As markets became more distinct from 
everyday life, society began to change in order to meet trending 
economic needs. One example of this transformation was the 
enclosure of English farmlands and the end of the ancient system 
of farming on land that was considered free for the use of all. 
This created a radical disruption in social function. Without 
farmland, thousands were forced to move to sites of industrial 
production, generating a radical shift in society from traditional 
agrarian life to one that was dominated by factory work. In other 
words, Polanyi’s book explains how markets became 
disembedded from society and then how these disembedded 
markets altered social activities as they became re-embedded into 
market function.2 
Polanyi never believed that society could become 
completely embedded within the market function, concluding 
that society’s members would never tolerate a market function 
which completely overwhelmed their social needs. This resistance 
* B.A., University of Prince Edward Island; LL.B. & LL.M., University of
British Columbia; Ph.D. Candidate & Adjunct Professor, York University 
Osgoode Hall Law School; Academic Director 2009-2010, CLPE Comparative 
Research in Law & Political Economy Network 
(www.comparativeresearch.net). I am grateful to Peer Zumbansen and 
Cynthia Williams for their comments on this paper, and also to Stephen 
Bainbridge and Mark Roe for their comments on an earlier version. 
1 KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (2d ed. 2001). 
2 Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem 
of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 482 (1985). 
T 
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to market pressures is what Polanyi called the “double 
movement.”3 Simon Deakin has elaborated on Polanyi’s idea of 
the double movement, explaining how it also operates in reverse.4 
In other words, market actors will resist projects for greater 
equality when these social demands compromise market 
functionality. The balance between favoring the needs of markets 
with the needs of society has fluctuated throughout the twentieth 
century.5 According to Deakin, the pendulum is swinging toward 
the modern economy’s increased need for markets as societal 
governance has become ever more closely tied to the expectations 
of investors.6 Today, certainly, the pendulum appears to be 
swinging in a different yet still unknown direction.7 
In his seminal article of 1985, Mark Granovetter 
elaborated upon Polanyi’s disembedded market theory and 
expanded it into a more complete (and complex) sociological 
theory of how embedded social behavior affects economic 
institutions.8 Granovetter argued that to adequately study 
economic institutions, like corporations, one must take into 
consideration how the behavior of such institutions is 
“constrained by ongoing social relations.”9 Granovetter’s 
central contention was that when economic reasoning ignores an 
institution’s social embeddedness, such reasoning is blinded to 
the actual social relationships within it and, accordingly, it is 
unlikely one will be able to understand how a particular 
institution functions (or fails to function).10  
Granovetter’s call to scrutinize the social relationships 
that affect an organization’s function has been seen as a 
sociological plea explaining why institutions behave as they do. 
He criticized the assumptions of New Institutional Economics by 
highlighting how actual social networks inside and outside of the 
corporation operate in ways that handcuff economic thought. 
3 For a detailed commentary on the double movement, see Fred Block, 
Introduction to POLANYI, supra note 1, at xxiii-xxvii.  
4 Simon Deakin, The Rise of Finance: What Is It, What Is Driving It, 
What Might Stop It? A Comment on “Finance and Labor: Perspectives on 
Risk, Inequality and Democracy” by Sanford Jacoby, 30 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y 67, 67-69 (2008). 
5 Block, supra note 3, at xxvii - xxvix. 
6 See Deakin, supra note 4, at 67-68.  
7 See Lawrence Mitchell, Financialism: A Lecture Delivered at Creighton 
University School of Law, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 323 (2009). 
8 Granovetter, supra note 2. 
9 Id. at 482. 
10 Id. at 481-82. 
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Specifically, Granovetter took issue with Oliver Williamson’s 
theory of transaction costs, arguing that while there was a certain 
analytical value to Williamson’s eventually highly influential 
market/hierarchy model of the corporation,11 it remained blind to 
the social reality of corporate function.12  
Up until now, Granovetter has served as something of a 
connector between Polanyi’s efforts and current ongoing 
investigations into the concept of embeddedness.13 Certainly, the 
new interest in economic sociology and its relevance in bridging 
discourses in sociology, legal theory, and political economy14 
contributes to a better understanding of the merits and 
boundaries of “economic governance;”15 something of 
particular importance at a time of fundamental readjustments to 
the financial credo of the last two decades.  
Legal theory itself reflects the early beginnings of such 
critical engagement with an exclusively economistic bias. John 
Dewey, in a famous inquiry into the law’s constitution of the 
corporation,16 identified the law as a powerful tool with the 
ability to take an abstract idea (such as the suggestion that the 
corporation was a “person”) and transform it into something 
more concrete and real (by, for example, granting a corporation 
the right to contract or equipping it with constitutional 
protections). Such legal reification, according to Dewey, shapes 
how people think about a corporation. As a consequence, this 
reification also shapes people’s behavior within, and in relation 
to, corporations.  
An important strand in studies on embeddedness and 
11 See Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, 
Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537 (1981); Oliver E. Williamson, The 
New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 595 (2000); Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess, Law, 
Economics and Evolutionary Theory: State of the Art and Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives, Osgoode Hall L. Sch. Comp. Res. in L. & Pol. Econ. Res. Paper 
Series, Paper No. 10/2010, 2010, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595158. 
12 Granovetter, supra note 2, at 493-504. 
13 Jens Beckert, The Great Transformation of Embeddedness. Karl Polanyi 
and the New Economic Sociology (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Societies, 
Discussion Paper No. 07/1, 2007).  
14 Jens Beckert & Wolfgang Streeck, Economic Sociology and Political 
Economy. A Programmatic Perspective (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of 
Societies, Working Paper 08/4, 2008). 
15 Zumbansen & Calliess, supra note 11. 
16 John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 
35 YALE L. J. 655 (1926). 
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comparative variations in national political economies around the 
world has been to focus on different forms of market 
organization.17 Central to such inquiries has been the analysis of 
the particular dynamics of reform politics that often emerged 
against the background of historically evolved path-
dependencies.18 Similarly, sociologists have long focused on sites 
where law is produced as “sites of contestation” between 
influential groups attempting to maintain or change the 
embedded patterns of social relationships. In Competition as a 
Cultural Phenomenon, Karl Mannheim detailed how preferences 
become entrenched or embedded within society through social 
processes like lawmaking and, in particular, through the 
competitive actions between influential social groups within these 
social processes.19 From this perspective, Mannheim can be seen 
as providing a promising approach for connecting Polanyi’s and 
Granovetter’s ideas of embeddedness with Dewey’s 
understanding of the legal reification of business ideas. Building 
upon this connection of ideas, Mannheim’s article explores one of 
the most important sites of contestation between influential 
business groups; namely, the place that has historically 
triumphed in attracting the highest number of Fortune 500 
business incorporation in America: Delaware – America’s 
regulatory laboratory for de facto “national” corporate law.   
The social process of how preferences become entrenched 
or embedded within American corporate charters is of particular 
importance to understanding such behavior within the American 
corporation. If Dewey was correct and the law shapes the 
behavior of actors within the business world, then the corporate 
charter is a central tool in this process. The corporate charter is 
the foundational contract of the corporation, establishing the 
distribution of wealth and power between its members and others 
outside of the corporate organization. In other words, it is a 
contract which formalizes social relations between the 
constituents of a corporation. Although the charter does not 
dictate all social relations within the corporation, it does set a 
17 VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001). 
18 John W. Cioffi, Restructuring "Germany Inc.": The Politics of Corporate 
Governance Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 L. & POL'Y 355 
(2002). 
19 KARL MANNHEIM, ESSAYS ON THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 197-98 
(Paul Kecskemeti ed., 1952). 
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standard for expectations for social relations and is highly 
influential in the embedding process. 
This Note provides a history of the legal debates over 
corporate charters in the American context beginning with a 
famous dispute that originated in a series of contesting law 
review articles in the 1970s. A brief literature review will recount 
the academic arguments that have provided the intellectual 
support for sustaining Delaware’s primacy over corporate 
lawmaking in the face of constant attack. By understanding the 
debates that have sustained Delaware’s ability to lead the 
American competition for incorporation, this Note provides 
insight into what is regarded as the most important legal 
instrument for maintaining status quo for actual social 
relationships within the American corporation: the “market for 
incorporation.” 
However, this Note will also draw attention to the 
growing skepticism over Delaware’s ability to consistently 
legislate optimal corporate law. This skepticism is most clearly 
evident in the federal government’s growing willingness to design 
and to pursue corporate law policies in the face of corporate 
governance scandal, notwithstanding the fact that corporate law 
in the United States is governed by the states. The consequences 
of these developments are subject to strict scrutiny and ongoing 
discussion. In sum, this Note provides an example of how shifts 
in lawmaking networks outside of the firm demand the potential 
to shift the embeddedness of the behavior of social relationships 
inside the firm.  
II. Historical Introduction
During the American republic’s early decades, state 
legislatures restricted the rights of corporate action by 
scrutinizing petitions for incorporation just as they would any 
other piece of legislation.20 In theory, democratic representatives 
granted incorporation only if it served the public interest, but 
healthy skepticism should be reserved for anyone who claims that 
this was always the case.21 Restrictions on the corporation were 
20 For the boundaries of government’s authority over incorporation, 
especially after the corporate charter was issued by the state, see Trustees of 
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). For greater detail, see 
David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L. J. 201, 206-10 (1990). 
21 DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATIONS VS. THE COURTS: PRIVATE POWER,
PUBLIC INTERESTS 85 (1999) (arguing that each request for incorporation was 
Stewart Article.doc (Do Not Delete) 12/29/2010  1:10:04 PM 
152 Loyola Consumer Law Review [Vol. 23:2
severe by today’s standards; for instance: 1) a corporation could 
not accumulate more than a set amount of capital;22 2) a 
corporation’s life was usually fixed to the time required to finish 
the task(s) that it was incorporated to accomplish;23 3) a 
corporation could not engage in activities that were not explicitly 
defined in the terms of its incorporation;24 and 4) a corporation’s 
business activities could not extend beyond the boundaries of the 
state in which it was incorporated.25   
Yet in spite of such limitations, the corporation was still a 
coveted investment vehicle. One reason for this was that the 
status of shareholders was a rare and prestigious privilege.26 
However, it would be misleading to conclude that this investment 
vehicle was desired merely because it offered a degree of social 
status. The main attraction to the corporation was more likely the 
limited liability protection it offered to businessmen27 and the 
opportunities for power and profits which large “public 
interest” projects presented.28 
By 1858, Americans had endured a depression, multiple 
stock market crashes, and witnessed what was perceived to be 
the floundering public management of large interstate canal 
projects. These events provoked a profound shift of public 
opinion regarding the relationship between public and private 
subject to the same lobbying and debate as any other bill, including “power 
plays, personal intrigues and local favoritism”). 
22 For a thorough collection of references to specific legislation from the 
19th century, see Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 550-54 (1933) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
23 Id. at 555. 
24 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588 (1839) (Taney, CJ, held that 
since the powers conferred on the corporation can be no greater than state 
power, which granted the incorporation, the firm had no authority to operate 
outside the state). 
25 Id. 
26 JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 14, 25, 28 
(1970).  
27 Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Developments of 
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 208-09 (1985) (arguing that although 
the common law had evolved to the point of presuming limited liability, state 
legislatures enacted legislation to extend their shareholder liability a bit further 
than the value of their share). 
28 Millon, supra note 20, at 207 (arguing that there was fear that the 
potential for power and wealth associated with incorporation caused 
Americans to fear that such organizations could threaten the opportunity of 
others to enter the market; adding that, as a result, governments rarely confer 
monopoly privileges).  
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power in American society.29 People began viewing government 
intervention in private transactions less as a means of securing 
liberty and more in terms of restricting it. Public authorities 
found themselves faced with a public that demanded justification 
for why the corporation must be a servant of public interest and, 
more importantly from the individual’s perspective, why private 
citizens should not use such corporations solely for personal 
advantage in the pursuit of happiness.30 Citizens also became less 
trusting of government discretion in granting incorporations 
because accusations of favoritism and corruption became 
widespread.31 With these adverse changes in public opinion, the 
government walls that confined corporate behavior began to 
crumble. Emerging state policy began to challenge the long-
established understanding that the function of the corporation 
was solely to serve the community.32 This shift, in turn, opened 
the door for the considerably activist U.S. Supreme Court to 
determine that corporations had constitutional rights, protecting 
corporations from the threat of public meddling in their affairs.33 
With the loosening of state policy and advancements in 
technology, the number of incorporations increased 
exponentially. Professional management teams, in turn, were 
hired more frequently as majority shareholders became less 
commonly involved in the corporation’s day-to-day 
29 For more on how the canals fiasco shifted public opinion, see CARTER
GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND
RAILWAY (1961); see also CARTER GOODRICH, JULIUS RUBIN, JEROME
CRANMER, AND HARVEY H. SEGAL, CANALS AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 241, 246-47 (1961) (describing what was perceived to be the 
costly financial failures of the nineteenth century canal projects, of which 
almost 3/4 of the $188 million invested between 1815 and 1860 came from the 
public purse). For more on how the other mentioned financial crisis affected 
public opinion, see WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF
THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION IN AMERICA 71-75 (1997). 
30 SCIULLI, supra note 21, at 89. 
31 HURST, supra note 26, at 33-36, 136. 
32 Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in 
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (1987) (arguing that changes in 
state law incorporation policies “eliminated any notion that incorporation 
was a special grant from the state, even the public nature of a corporation’s 
purpose could be called into doubt”). 
33 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). For a 
detailed understanding of the case and a detailed argument regarding the 
fallout from this case in America, see Horwitz, supra note 27. For a contrasting 
point of view, see Millon, supra note 20. 
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management.34 These radical transformations created a flood of 
new and complex issues into state courts – necessitating the call 
for legal clarity.35 This inspired the creation of specific state 
judiciaries to oversee corporate practice.36 Willing jurisdictions 
(in particular, New Jersey and Delaware) customized regulatory 
environments to attract those businessmen shopping for the most 
advantageous jurisdiction to incorporate their businesses.37 Such 
states also began to adopt new management-friendly legislation, 
mostly because the franchise taxes, fee revenues, and taxation on 
extra business opportunities (which followed incorporation) filled 
state coffers.38  
Beginning in the mid-1800s, a gradual loosening of 
government policy occurred. For example, in 1846, New York 
started a trend in state reform which blocked the legislature from 
creating corporations by special act, except in the rare case where 
the objectives for devising the corporation could not be attained 
under general law.39 In addition, in 1867, the U.S. Congress 
expanded bankruptcy protections to include corporations.40 
Further, in 1875, New Jersey eliminated the restrictions on the 
corporation’s ability to accumulate capital.41 In 1886, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that the private corporation was a “natural 
person” under the U.S. Constitution, therefore protected by the 
Bill of Rights, which broadly protected the corporations from 
public authority.42 New Jersey offered the first standard articles 
34 SCIULLI, supra note 21, at 90. 
35 HURST , supra note 26, at 82-83. 
36 Id.  
37 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and The Corporation: The Desirable 
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1443 
(1992) (describing the pressures and incentives, which started jurisdiction 
competition for incorporation); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate 
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663, 669-70 (1974) (arguing 
that state competition has lead to a “a race for the bottom” in terms of the 
standards for corporate governance – in particular to the disadvantage of 
shareholders).  
38 Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History 
and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 888 (1990); Cary, supra note 37, at 668-
69; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition 
and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 
CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 762 (1987). 
39  N.Y. CONST. OF 1846, art. VIII, § 1. 
40  SCIULLI, supra note 21, at 91. 
41 Id. 
42 Horwitz, supra note 27; see also Millon, supra note 20. 
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of incorporation for private businesses in 1888.43 In one reflexive 
jerk away from the growing power of the mighty corporation, the 
Sherman Antitrust Act was signed in 1890.44 But still racing 
forward at the state level, in 1896, New Jersey adopted what 
could be recognized as the first modern corporate statutes and, 
thus, it became the home to the majority of America’s largest 
corporations (a title that Delaware would steal within twenty 
years).45 In 1910, the Supreme Court nullified restrictions on 
corporate capacity to conduct business outside the states in which 
it was chartered.46 By 1933, Mr. Justice Brandeis, reflecting on 
this historical trend toward state competition in corporate law in 
Liggett Co. v. Lee,47 expressed concern over how the fear of losing 
existing state revenue and the allure of earning greater state 
revenue was eroding the diligent construction of corporate legal 
development by replacing it with a permissive consumer product 
that pandered to powerful corporate interests. 
III. The First Wave: Drawing the Distinction
In one of the most influential articles ever published by 
the Yale Law Journal,48 William Cary reconsidered the trends in 
federalism and corporate law from the nineteenth century 
forward and declared that modern state corporate law was a 
product of state competition. Most importantly, states were 
legislatively competing to attract incorporation to increase state 
revenues, creating a dangerous “race-to-the-bottom” for 
corporate governance standards.49 Cary’s focus quickly turned to 
the by-then leader of this race, Delaware. He opined that 
Delaware’s motivation for its considerably softened stance on 
corporate governance standards was motivated by the state’s 
budget dependence on revenues from incorporations, therefore 
creating an inversely indebted relationship between the state and 
those corporate managers looking to incorporate. This compelled 
Delaware to offer advantageous corporate legal arrangements 
that allowed managers broad and unchecked authority; therefore, 
43 ROY, supra note 29, at 152-53. 
44 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1–7 (2006). 
45 Bebchuk , supra note 37, at 1443. 
46 Millon, supra note 20, at 212-13. 
47 288 U.S. 517, 557 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
48 It was called the most influential piece ever published by the Yale Law 
Journal, see Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law 
Journal, 100 YALE L. J. 1449 (1991). 
49 Cary, supra note 37, at 666. 
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corporations were no longer faced with the disincentive required 
to curb less-than-optimal corporate performance.50 Cary argued 
that it was time for the federal government and the judiciary to 
“import lifting standards” that would set a level beyond which 
corporate standards would not be allowed to fall below and 
“deteriorate.”51 
Three years later, in 1977, Ralph K. Winter wrote a reply 
to Cary’s position which by this time had almost universally 
become endorsed as a matter of fact. In the face of this general 
consensus, Winter boldly rejected Cary’s position arguing that 
state competition should “tend toward optimality so far as the 
shareholders’ relationship to the corporation is concerned” and 
thus corporate governance standards, like those of Delaware, 
“are optimal legal arrangements.”52 Put differently, what Cary 
regarded as a “race-to-the-bottom” Winter replaced as a 
“race-to-the-top.”  
Borrowing from the ideas of Henry Manne,53 Oliver 
Williamson,54 and Armen A. Alchian,55 Winter constructed an 
argument which suggested that because corporations acquired 
capital by selling bonds and equity, management was therefore 
forced to weigh the interests of such financial actors and 
instruments.56 Winter posited that “the state which ‘rigs’ its 
code to benefit management will drive debt and equity capital 
away.”57 Furthermore, he argued that, although Cary was 
correct in assessing that managers ultimately had the consumer 
50 Id. at 668-69. 
51 Id. at 705. 
52 Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of 
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977). 
53 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 
J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); see also Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation 
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967). 
54 Oliver Williamson, Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm, in 
THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 281 (Henry G. Manne ed., 
1969). 
55 Armen A. Alchian & Reuben A. Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and the 
Pursuit of Pecuniary Gain, in ASPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 156 (National 
Bureau of Economic Research ed., 1962) available at 
http://www.nber.org.flagship.luc.edu/chapters/c0605.pdf; see also Armen A. 
Alchian, Corporate Management and Property Rights, in ECONOMIC POLICY
AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES (Henry G. Manne ed., 
1969); see also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information 
Cost and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
56 Winter, supra note 52, at 289. 
57 Id. 
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power to decide which jurisdiction to incorporate, managers 
would not select a jurisdiction that would cause their business to: 
1) earn lower-than-normal returns; and/or 2) have a higher cost of 
capital.58 On the contrary, managers would select jurisdictions 
that afforded the opposite for the sake of self-preservation. Thus, 
state competition, also known as the charter market, produced an 
optimal corporate law regime which accurately reflected the 
demands that corporate constituents had for corporate 
governance.59 
The rationale for the charter market that causes the race-
to-the-top can be restated as follows: If the corporate legal regime 
is structured so that management cannot maximize the corporate 
output (profits), debt holders may make it more expensive to: 1) 
hold debt; and 2) raise new debt.60 This corporate legal regime 
will also depress stock price potential thereby making it more 
expensive to raise new capital as well as maintain optimal 
relations with shareholders and creditors. Such underperforming 
firms will become targets for takeover, and the threat of takeover 
will create a market for managerial control.61 Thus, managers 
will have ample incentive to demand an off-the-rack default 
statutory model of corporate governance that encourages 
shareholder maximization.62 Since such a default model can be 
assumed to be what managers are shopping for when they select a 
jurisdiction to incorporate, this is what state competition will 
foster.63 Thus, the charter market creates a race-to-the-top. 
Furthermore, it creates a system of legal innovation that is not 
compromised by political interference – which would ultimately 
be the result of Cary’s recommendation for federal government 
intervention.  
With the two sides of the Cary/Winter debate delineated, 
the stage seemed set for the next three decades with the advocates 
of Cary’s position representing: 1) anti-managerialism; 2) federal 
intervention in state competition; and 3) more centralized 
planning, and the advocates of Winter’s position representing: 1) 
managerialism; 2) unfettered state competition; and 3) more 
decentralized market rationality.64 Underpinning both positions 





62 Id. at 290. 
63 Id. 
64 For more analysis on Winter’s theory, see Roberta Romano, Law as a 
Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225 
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was an understanding that the firm was a distinct market actor 
that focused squarely upon finding an optimal solution to the 
shareholder-management problem.  
IV. The Second Wave: Event Studies and the Attempts to Settle 
the Cary-Winter Debate 
Winter’s economic analysis of charter markets forced Cary 
proponents to adjust their arguments by taking a more 
economically sophisticated position. Following Winter’s lead, 
they employed more economically savvy arguments to suggest 
that shareholders (and creditors) had much less control over 
managers’ incorporation preferences in practice than Winter’s 
charter market theory suggested and, thus, the race-to-the-top 
argument was flawed.65 In response, others became inspired to 
settle this theoretical tit-for-tat debate by engaging in empirical 
research in the form of “event studies.”66 These studies 
established that many stocks affected by the amendments rose in 
value when the markets learned of the amendments, thereby 
bolstering Winter’s position that state competition was 
advantageous for shareholders. 
Those defending Cary’s position fired back. Melvin 
Eisenberg rejected these event studies, arguing that they had 
“only limited usefulness” in the context of the Cary-Winter 
                                                                                                                                       
(1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product]; ROBERTA ROMANO, THE 
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION 26 (Spring 2003); Leo 
E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to 
Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1759, 1775 (2006); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008). For representatives from the 
Cary camp, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1508 (1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, 
Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1170 (1999); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf 
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition 
over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L. J. 553 (2002) [hereinafter Bebchuk & 
Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk]; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case 
for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). 
65 Eisenberg, supra note 64. 
66 Event studies were simply empirical tests which gauged market 
responses to corporate law amendments. See generally Peter Dodd & Richard 
Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: ‘Unhealthy Competition’ vs. 
Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259 (1980); Romano, Law as a Product, supra 
note 64; Jeffry Netter & Annette Poulsen, State Corporation Laws and 
Shareholders: The Recent Experience, 18 FIN. MGMT. 29 (1989). 
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debate.67 Specifically, Eisenberg contended that if a uniformly 
low-grade corporate law regime existed – as Cary seemed to 
suggest – then the notice of an amendment from “one low-grade 
regime to another would not be a significant event.”68 He also 
suggested that Delaware’s mature case law increased 
predictability, which helped to countervail potentially suboptimal 
rules and amendments. More importantly, Eisenberg emphasized 
that other contributory factors may have skewed the results of the 
event studies.69 One example of such factors included packaging 
negative amendments to existing law with positive ones.70 
Eisenberg suggested that such event studies were limited because 
the economic analysis was so superficial that it could not 
adequately appreciate the complexity of the American “charter 
market.”71 Lucian Bebchuk made similar arguments that 
suggested how negative information can be packaged with 
positive information in order to maintain or improve stock value, 
while also re-emphasizing that Cary’s position was still correct.72 
Within four years of Eisenberg’s reply, Roberta Romano 
published what would become the landmark statement in 
support of Winter.73 Aimed at responding to Eisenberg’s demand 
for “deeper economic analysis,”74 Romano employed the lenses 
of: 1) financial risk management within equity markets; 2) agency 
cost theory; and 3) the relational understanding between socio-
legal norms and market forces, which - taken together - helped to 
better understand the mechanics of the charter market. In the 
end, this deeper economic analysis led both Eisenberg and 
Romano closer to a centrist position, with Eisenberg leaning 
toward Cary’s position75 and Romano toward Winter’s.76 
                                                          
67 Eisenberg, supra note 64, at 1508. 
68 Id.  
69 Eisenburg posited that such contributing factors were not taken into 
consideration during the event studies. Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id at 1509. 
72 Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and The Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992). 
73 ROMANO, supra note 64. 
74 See Eisenberg, supra note 64 (Eisenberg uses this language to level his 
criticism of the superficial nature of the event studies). 
75 Id. at 1509. 
76 ROMANO, supra note 64, at 148. 
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V. The Third Wave: Post-Enron  
Alas, the debate was not dead. Lucian Bebchuk took 
Cary’s side and warned that state competition encouraged a race-
to-the-bottom given the states’ obvious inclination to make rules 
attractive to managers and controllers.77 In 1999, Bebchuk and 
Allen Ferrell illustrated how anti-takeover statutes were 
inefficient and reduced shareholder wealth,78 and illustrated one 
clear example of how states provided default rules that benefited 
only managers to the detriment of all other constituents, and 
“should lead the many who offer unqualified support of state 
competition to reassess their position.”79 But in 1999, the U.S. 
economy was hot, the inflation-adjusted aggregate output was 
up, real gross domestic product was up, corporate profits were 
up, employment was up, and everyone was making money. 
Bebchuk’s concerns were inaudible over the sound of investors’ 
portfolios filling with money. Corporate America seemed to be 
anything but broken.   
All that changed in 2001 when the Enron Scandal 
outraged Americans and pulled corporate governance under the 
microscope.80 In step with this change in climate, Bebchuk 
reiterated his position that the empirical evidence supported the 
view that state competition offered harmful incentives, which 
privileged managers to the detriment of all other corporate 
constituents.81 Building on this critique, Bebchuk went on to 
argue that Delaware’s position in the charter market was so 
strong that assumptions about the operation of state competition 
were false. In other words, Delaware was more sheltered from the 
influence of other states’ actions than was assumed in the 
literature, producing suboptimal corporate rules and justifying 
federal intervention.82 
In the summer of 2002, the federal government induced 
aggressive measures to appease populist reactions to the Enron 
scandal. Suddenly, there was a rash movement toward Cary’s 
federal intervention that may have been procedurally pleasing to 
some corporate governance observers, but was ultimately 
                                                          
77 Bebchuk & Ferrell, supra note 64. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1199. 
80 See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder 
Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002). 
81 See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition 
in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002). 
82 Bebchuk & Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk, supra note 64. 
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substantively disappointing to most. With this came renewed 
interest in the Cary-Winter debate. 
In this vein, Mark Roe set out to offer some fresh insight 
building on Bebchuk’s suggestion that Delaware was in fact 
insulated from state competition, not its catalyst.83 Roe concluded 
that the nature of corporate regulatory competition had been 
“misconceived – and badly so,” arguing that Delaware’s chief 
competition was never other states but, instead, the federal 
government.84 Other states did not have the constitutional 
authority to trump Delaware’s default rules for corporate 
governance, but the federal government did. In other words, 
Delaware’s incorporation regime existed because the federal 
government tolerated it. Accordingly, the results of corporate law 
evolution may have been due in part to state competition, but the 
ever-looming threat of federal intervention was also a major 
factor. Which of these two factors affected the evolution of 
corporate law was difficult to determine because the world of 
Delaware policymaking was opaque.  
Roe further suggested that if the competition between 
Delaware and the federal government was considered when 
attempting to understand the traditionally conceived mechanism 
of state competition, the state race debate did not play out the 
way charter market analysis had been assuming all along.85 He 
suggested that a new theory was necessary to explain how policy 
networks forged American corporate law, arguing that top-down 
“centralized strategic” planning had as much responsibility for 
corporate law outcomes as did lateral state competition.86 This 
would give support to the idea that the federal political 
dimension compromises the narrow quest for solely 
understanding state competition through the assumed model of 
charter markets as constructed during the second wave of the 
debate. 
In 2003, one year after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(“SOX”), Stephen Bainbridge took a polarizing position as far 
to the Winter end of the continuum as Bebchuk had taken to 
Cary’s.87 Bainbridge blasted the federalization of corporate law, 
calling the actions of Congress and other regulators “deeply 
                                                          
83 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003). 
84 Id. at 591. 
85 Id. at 646 
86 Id. 
87 Bainbridge, supra note 64. 
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flawed.”88 He argued that, since the Enron scandal, the actions 
of the federal government represented “the most dramatic 
expansion of federal regulatory power over corporate governance 
since the New Deal.”89 Rejecting the federal reforms as an 
unnecessary encroachment on state jurisdiction, Bainbridge 
pointed to Romano’s event study in support of his claim that 
state competition, and Delaware’s default rules, favored 
shareholders by maximizing shareholder wealth.90 When 
addressing Bebchuk’s 1999 argument about the negative effects 
of state competition upon shareholder wealth by legislating anti-
takeover statutes, his response was “so what . . . nobody claims 
that state competition is perfect.”91 He also proclaimed that 
“even if Bebchuk could prove that state competition is a race-to-
the-bottom, basic principles of federalism would still counsel 
against federal preemption of corporate law,” because the 
potential for regulatory innovation would be seriously 
compromised.92 
In 2005, Roe reemphasized that American scholars ought 
to recognize that the presumptions on state competition were 
skewing their perception, arguing that instead of looking at the 
results of horizontal state competition, observers needed to 
understand when the federal government decided to leave such 
authority in the hands of the states and when it decided to claw 
back such authority for itself.93 Instead of Delaware being the 
product of market pressures, Roe viewed Delaware as a political 
group with a narrowly-defined range of concerns within the 
larger policy network of corporate law development.94 In this 
light, Delaware’s policymaking network was like a caucus of 
managers and investors. And within this caucus, Roe deemed 
that managers clearly had the “upper hand” in guiding policy 
development, but these same managers also appeared to exercise 
self-restraint because they understood “the game could move to 
Washington” if the scales were pushed too far toward 
managerialism.95  
Also in 2005, Leo E. Strine, Jr., Vice Chancellor of 
                                                          
88 Id. at 26. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 30. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2494 (2005). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 2542. 
Stewart Article.doc (Do Not Delete)  12/29/2010  1:10:04 PM 
2010] Place of Corporate Lawmaking in American Society 163 
Delaware’s Court of Chancery, set out to “take some of the 
mystery out of Delaware’s role in the governance of American 
public corporations.”96 When discussing the politics of state 
competition, however, Strine was noticeably reserved. He alluded 
to the fact that Delaware was and will be in the lead for some 
time to come in the state race for corporate law.97 In defining the 
boundaries of state competition, he stated that the issues of 
competition, labor, trade, and disclosures to public investors were 
generally regulated federally, while Delaware governed the 
“internal affairs of the corporation.”98 He never more than 
tacitly acknowledged that the federal government had full 
authority to regulate in this area as well.99 In other words, Strine 
failed to directly acknowledge that Delaware’s power was a 
privilege granted to the state by the federal government and not a 
constitutional right. Accordingly, Strine does not elaborate on this 
federal power other than to say that present interventions like 
SOX and the amendments to listing requirements were 
suboptimal reforms. 
In an exchange in the Harvard Law Review, the issue of 
federal intervention in the Delaware caucus was raised once 
again. Bebchuk argued that managers were too powerful and 
were blocking shareholders from maximizing shareholder 
value.100 Accordingly, he asserted that, since managers dominated 
state law, the federal government had to intervene.101 In response, 
Strine entertained Bebchuk’s proposal,102 but emphasized that 
such reform “must emanate from state policymakers;”103 
Delaware (and not the federal government) ought to be “the 
primary source of substantive corporate law” reform.104 
Bainbridge, in his response to Bebchuk, did not exhibit any of the 
potential flexibility that Strine did. He flatly rejected Bebchuk’s 
call for greater shareholder empowerment by arguing that if 
Bebchuk’s proposal could really enhance the value of the firm, 
why did it not already exist? In challenging Bebchuk in this 
                                                          
96 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and 
Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673 
(2005). 
97 Id. at 673-74. 
98 Id. at 674. 
99 Id. at 686 
100 Bebchuk, supra note 64.  
101 Id. at 874.  
102 Strine, supra note 64, at 1775. 
103 Id. at 1777. 
104 Id. at 1780. 
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manner, Bainbridge employed a classic Winteresque race-to-the-
top argument.105 Bainbridge rejected any changes to Delaware’s 
law and lawmaking capacity.  
In reply, Bebchuk was somewhat encouraged by Strine’s 
opinions (although he believed they did not extend far enough).106 
Bebchuk attacked Bainbridge’s race-to-the-top argument by 
referencing a Winteresque argument from 1983, which advocated 
against federal intervention to better regulate insider trading. The 
1983 article argued there was nothing wrong with the existing 
standards since charter competition would have already corrected 
them if they were suboptimal. This example illustrated the error 
of assuming that state competition already provided optimal 
corporate governance arrangements as Bainbridge suggested.107 
In an interesting twist, Bebchuk pointed out that the innovative 
nature of state competition implied state law was subject to 
improvement in an evolving context.108 Thus, even if one 
assumed Delaware produced optimal corporate law, it did not 
mean his proposition ought to be rejected outright.  
The recent Bebchuk/Strine/Bainbridge debate helps to 
confirm Roe’s observation that the true motivator for corporate 
governance innovation is the threat of federal intervention. 
Bebchuk’s call for such intervention caused a defense of 
Delaware from both Strine and Bainbridge, and also a 
willingness on Strine’s part to seriously entertain various 
shareholder empowerment initiatives. This reflects what is at 
stake in these debates over Delaware: the spectrum of embedded 
relationships between public and private power in American 
society. 
VI. What Place Does Delaware Reserve for the Corporation in 
American Society? A Reflection of Bainbridge 
A. The Delaware Status Quo 
Delaware attempts to enshrine managerialism within 
American corporate governance. Delaware’s historic trump card 
                                                          
105 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1737-42 (2006) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge 2006]. 
106 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1796 (2006). 
107 Id. at 1805. 
108 Id. at 1808.  
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is the race-to-the-top argument,109 but recent history challenges 
whether favoring managerialism is the optimal strategy for 
regulating the corporation. Amidst corporate scandal and 
economic downturns over the past decade, managerialism has 
garnered much scrutiny and created agency issues. The solutions 
for these agency relationship problems, which were inspired by 
the work of Michael Jensen and William Meckling,110 appear 
insufficient to cope with managerial opportunism as well as 
responsible risk management. 
This section explores the writing of one of Delaware’s 
most loyal defenders: Stephen Bainbridge. Bainbridge defends 
Delaware while simultaneously distancing himself from 
managerialism. Bainbridge claims that American directors are 
undergoing a transformation, becoming more than de facto 
rubber stamps for managerial power.111 He has developed a 
theory he calls “director primacy,” which re-invents the 
managerialist position in a way that can appeal to both 
managerialists and anti-managerialists.112 By taking the 
shareholder/manager dichotomy and splitting it into a 
shareholder/director/manager trichotomy, Bainbridge places 
corporate directors firmly in the middle of the struggle between 
ownership and control. The brilliance of this position is that it 
personifies what Delaware’s corporate law has de jure attempted 
to enforce since the rise of the modern corporation. The weakness 
in Bainbridge’s argument, however, is that history proves that 
American directors have not always lived up to the model of 
corporate governance.  
If American directors are becoming more loyal to 
shareholder concerns, then director primacy is the driving force 
in a coup d’état in American corporate governance. However, 
those skeptical of Bainbridge will argue that this shift is not 
occurring and that his director primacy argument is no more than 
managerialism with a twist, albeit a clever twist that distances his 
position from the criticism of managerialism, while still 
sustaining the status quo in American corporate governance. And 
to a degree this criticism is fair – the ends of Bainbridge’s director 
primacy position are still the same as those of managerialism in 
                                                          
109 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 98-99, 103-04, 192-94, 200, 233. 
110 See Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 
305 (1976). 
111 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64.  
112 Id. 
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one important respect: both empower managers, at least until 
such time as the boards of America’s large public corporations 
start behaving in the manner that Bainbridge projects they will.   
Even with federal initiatives to bolster director 
independence, Bainbridge himself acknowledges the 
Panoglossian nature of being optimistic about the present 
potential for director primacy. For example, he fully recognizes 
the problem of directors side-stepping their accountability to 
important constituents, such as shareholders.113 And yet, just 
under the surface of American corporate law (which has always 
enshrined director primacy in a “wink-wink, nudge-nudge” 
sort of a way) may be another managerial revolution114 which will 
blur the classic distinctions between shareholder/manager and 
managerialist/anti-managerialist by encouraging the board of 
directors to take their duties more seriously. The director primacy 
norms may cause directors to start standing up to the special 
interests of managers and protecting shareholder interests more 
diligently. As a result, this may foster a better relationship 
between ownership and control and help resolve some of the 
serious agency issues that exist today. 
B. Bainbridge’s Director Primacy 
The necessary shift in corporate governance, which can 
make director primacy transcend from theory into business 
reality and become the dominant model, will occur when boards 
of directors become more than mere rubber stamps for CEOs and 
other top executives. Bainbridge claims that this shift has 
commenced, arguing that directors are finally about to seize the 
mantle of power that corporate law has for so long reserved for 
itself.115 However, until this time, directors have rarely been 
                                                          
113 Id. at 98-99, 103-04, 192-94, 200, 233. 
114 The first Managerialist revolution occurred with the contractarian shift 
to “the Market” in the 1970s, which resulted in managers shifting their focus 
away from balancing the constituent interests of the firm and towards 
maximizing shareholder value. For an explanation of the evolution of 
corporate governance by dividing it into historical paradigms, see Peer 
Zumbansen, The Evolution of the Corporation: Organization, Finance, 
Knowledge and Corporate Social Responsibility, CLPE Research Paper No. 
6/2009 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346971.  
115 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64. For examples of the development of 
director primacy, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus 
of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002) (this is an introduction to the 
conceptual foundation for his theory of director primacy) [hereinafter 
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separated from “managers” in the managerialist forum, and for 
good reason since directors are rarely distinguishable from 
corporate executives in their decision making choices.116 For this 
reason, beneath Bainbridge’s director primacy lays a contentious 
theory that a functional revolution is occurring in American 
corporate governance. This functional revolution may or may not 
be happening and is difficult to substantiate, but if Bainbridge is 
correct, then director primacy will mark a historic shift in 
governance away from Chandler’s model of managerialism 
(which has dominated corporate thinking throughout the 
twentieth century) toward the board-centered fiat model, which 
director primacy endorses.  
In promoting director primacy, Bainbridge strongly 
advocates Delaware’s off-the-rack default statutory model of 
corporate governance which protects the board’s authority 
against direct shareholder influence in day-to-day decision 
making. In fact, it has even been suggested that Bainbridge 
advocates a more pro-board position than even Delaware 
dares.117 He describes how Delaware’s corporate law protects the 
primacy of the directors to govern the corporation, asserting that 
this doctrinal position sits well with prevailing corporate 
                                                                                                                                       
Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts]; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director 
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
547 (2003) (revisiting director primacy, including: decision-making by fiat; the 
primacy of the board of directors over shareholders and managers; the 
relationship between the director primacy model and the nexus of contracts 
model; and the importance of centralized decision-making for efficient 
corporate governance by balancing the need for balancing authority and 
accountability within corporate regulation). 
116 For instance, read The Economist’s claim that directors are the lapdogs 
of managers on the critical issue of executive compensation: “… many bosses 
in other industries are overpaid because weak boards have allowed them to 
dictate the terms of their compensation. As a result, pay bears little 
relationship to performance and tends to rise inexorably. A chief critic of the 
supposed corporate gravy-train is Warren Buffett. At the annual meeting of 
his holding company, Berkshire Hathaway, on May 2nd the legendary investor 
railed against a system that lets chief executives choose the members of 
remuneration committees. This, he claimed, allows them to select compliant 
directors prepared to wave through pay proposals. ‘These people aren’t 
looking for Dobermans,’ he complained. ‘They’re looking for cocker 
spaniels.’” Attacking the Corporate Gravy Train, THE ECONOMIST, May 28, 
2009. 
117 For more detail on this argument, see Brett H. McDonnell, Professor 
Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of The New Corporate 
Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139 (2009). 
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theory.118 In particular, he contends that Delaware’s director 
primacy fits nicely with the contractarian concept of the firm.119 
Bainbridge explains that decision making by fiat, which the 
board represents, is where the nexus of contracts meet and where 
the decision making power about how to manage this nexus is 
most efficiently allocated.120  
Bainbridge explains that there will always be a need to 
balance the authority and accountability of directors, but the 
complexities and demands of managing this nexus suggest that 
careful consideration must be taken before limiting the authority 
of the board.121 He warns that there is a great danger that limiting 
board authority will stifle the corporation’s ability to innovate.122 
Bainbridge offers a number of arguments for broad directorial 
discretion,123 possibly providing his best defense of Delaware’s 
allocation of authority to directors (which may be at the expense 
of greater shareholder empowerment). However, if what he 
contends is true, this broad discretion is ultimately in the 
shareholder’s best interest.  
Although Bainbridge argues that corporate boards do (and 
should) have final authority over decision making, his arguments 
also align with the shareholder primacy position: that such 
decision making authority must be for the sole benefit of 
shareholders. He justifies this position normatively by using the 
dubious majoritarian default model. This model suggests that the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm is what all stakeholders 
of the firm ultimately want because default rules that pander to 
management are inefficient – increasing the cost of capital, 
creating greater vulnerability to hostile takeover, and negatively 
affecting the overall health of the corporation. The distinction 
that Bainbridge makes between director primacy and shareholder 
primacy is that the advocates of shareholder primacy extend their 
backing of shareholder power beyond the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm by pushing for shareholders to have more 
direct control over the day-to-day affairs of the firm. Director 
primacy advocates argue only the shareholder wealth 
                                                          
118 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at IX–XII. 
119 See Bainbridge, Nexus of Contracts, supra note 115. 
120 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 32–35. 
121 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention 
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004). 
122 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 124–26. 
123 For more details read Bainbridge’s relevant arguments, see 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 45-75. 
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maximization norm.  
Putting the collective action problems of a widely 
dispersed shareholder class aside, Bainbridge suggests that 
directors, who are motivated primarily by the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm, will more vigilantly care for the firm’s 
wellbeing for the benefit of shareholders than direct shareholder 
empowerment.124 One reason for this is the ease with which 
shareholders can exit the firm. Such unattached shareholder 
influence can shift the firm’s focus to short-term, ill-informed, 
and/or self-serving goals that can possibly corrupt prudent 
corporate strategy over the long-term. Another reason for 
endorsing director primacy is that such direct shareholder 
empowerment would serve only to endorse the special interests of 
those who have power within the shareholder class: institutional 
investors.  
Bainbridge justifies why authority ought to rest with the 
board of directors within the corporate governance structure by 
arguing that a governance group (that acts collegially) is superior 
to a single autocrat at the apex of the corporate governance 
hierarchy.125 In making this argument, he offers evidence from 
the behavioral economics literature which explains why group 
decision making is of higher quality than individual decision 
making.126 This leads Bainbridge to conclude that corporate 
boards are more effective at monitoring corporate governance 
than a single autocrat, and thus the fiat model is generally the 
best option.127  
The main problem with the fiat model remains: who 
watches the watchers? In other words, who keeps the board of 
directors from being poisoned by groupthink and/or other forms 
of collective action failure? And who keeps the board of directors 
from social loafing and/or other serious opportunistic behavior? 
Bainbridge’s answer is the board itself.128 The arguments 
justifying this answer are at best hopeful. The optimism of his 
                                                          
124 Id. at 55-57. 
125 Id. at 78-79. 
126 For more details read Bainbridge’s relevant arguments, see id. at 82-
104; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in 
Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) (exploring why the default 
statutory model of corporate governance promotes a governance group that 
acts collegially, using evidence from the behavioral sciences to help explain 
why group decision-making is generally superior to individual decision-
making). 
127  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 104. 
128 Id. at 75-78. 
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answer may make some hardened anti-managerialists smile 
cruelly at the lack of realism that one must embrace to whole-
heartedly be at ease with the potential of directors self-
monitoring.  
To be fair, this is a serious problem with no easy answer; 
and to his credit, Bainbridge attacks it directly. Ultimately, 
though, his arguments are more sound regarding the avoidance of 
collective action failure than they are regarding the avoidance of 
opportunistic behavior. Albeit, the group dynamic makes 
opportunism less attractive for one individual within the group 
than it would for an all-powerful autocrat with no equals. That 
said, the suggestion that social norms (like reputational cost and 
the virtues of the communal life within the boardroom) will 
prevent the board from acts of opportunism at the expense of all 
other constituents of the firm may be too sweet for some intimate 
observers of director politics to swallow. 
Bainbridge suggests that a key problem for corporate 
governance is locating the appropriate balance between 
providing enough authority for the board to govern the firm in an 
efficient manner, while not providing so much discretion that 
authority becomes unreviewable, uncorrectable, and ultimately 
unaccountable.129 Therefore, at one extreme, efficiency demands 
that board decisions are shielded from shareholders and courts; 
otherwise, optimal risk-taking will be discouraged and the 
internal team governance structure could be seriously 
compromised by the fear of hindsight review.  
What about the courts protecting shareholders from 
extensive director discretion? Bainbridge reasons that 
shareholders are protected from “optimal” risk-taking by the 
dual functioning of limited liability and portfolio diversity.130 At 
the other extreme, if directors flagrantly violate their obligation to 
maximize shareholder wealth, the threat of judicial accountability 
must come out as a deterrent for corporate irresponsibility. 
However, this is not an easy balance to strike. Bainbridge warns 
that judges must use caution because they are not business 
experts, and because hindsight can make decision making look 
more irresponsible when the consequences of those decisions are 
known to have been negatively magnified. 
In determining the balance to be struck between authority 
and accountability, Bainbridge sides with the Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co. case, which provides a conservative 
                                                          
129 Id. at 153. 
130 Id. at 115. 
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interpretation of the application of the business judgment rule.131 
The Unocal interpretation views the business judgment rule 
through the lens of the doctrine of abstention. This interpretation 
suggests that the business judgment rule allows the courts to go 
no further than to assess whether a board was disinterested and 
independent in their decision-making process (good faith) and 
that the decision-making process was reasonable (sans gross 
negligence).132 Thus, Bainbridge endorses a presumption in favor 
of strong judicial deference to board decisions as long as there is 
some evidence of good faith and competence. He ultimately 
justifies this position by reasoning that directors cannot be made 
more accountable without compromising their authority, leading 
to less-than-optimal risk-taking.133 
The key to director primacy, therefore, is establishing that 
directors are becoming agents of change by: 1) severing their 
more or less exclusive loyalty to “managers;” 2) championing 
the rights of all shareholders; and 3) forging further corporate 
governance. It is here that director primacy either lives or dies by 
the sword, for when Bainbridge attacks managerialism as 
inadequate he is indirectly challenged to establish how the 
distinction drawn between managerialism and his director 
primacy is in fact defensible.  
Before Bainbridge, most traditional managerialists 
assumed that their readers understood that directors were 
included in the term “managers” because no clear distinction 
between the decision making outcomes of directors and senior 
executives was thought to exist. One major reason for this pre-
determination was that the CEO was generally the office where 
actual power consolidated in public corporations. In practice, the 
CEO had tremendous control over: 1) who would be on the ballot 
for board elections; and 2) the flow of information from corporate 
operations to the board. Many times, the CEO was on the board 
(if not the chairman of the board), making frank discussions 
about managerial performance during board meetings difficult at 
best. Thus, the CEO accumulated a great deal of power to 
manage the corporation. So much that if there was one individual 
that Bainbridge had in mind in his comparison between group 
decision making and individual decision making, the CEO would 
                                                          
131 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 947 (Del. 1985). 
132 For full analysis of the Unocal test, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 
137-40. 
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likely be that individual as he or she has historically been the 
corporation’s best approximation of the single autocrat at the 
apex of the corporate governance hierarchy. In fact, it is not 
always clear how much the influence of the CEO has changed in 
the day-to-day function of the corporation. 
When Bainbridge looks to the future of corporate 
governance in America, he sees two competing models: 
shareholder primacy and director primacy.134 He petitions for 
greater vigilance in the face of today’s pressure to extend the 
shareholder franchise.135 Bainbridge notes that, although 
shareholders are the sole beneficiaries of corporate governance 
and although directors have a duty to enforce shareholder wealth 
maximization, there is very good reason why shareholder power 
is so limited.136 He argues that shareholder primacy is a flawed 
account of American corporate governance and, accordingly, in 
appreciating the reasons for this, director primacy emerges from 
the cries that proclaim greater shareholder primacy is the 
enlightened path for corporate governance.137  
Bainbridge contends that no shareholder empowerment 
amendments are needed in order to ensure that the American 
corporate governance model optimizes shareholder protection.138 
                                                          
134 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the 
Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAW 45 (2002). 
135 Id. (Clarifying that most scholars in the convergence debate assume 
that American corporate law primarily promotes shareholder primacy, when it 
actually promotes director primacy, warning that such confusion may have 
serious consequences when transplanting the American model into recipient 
jurisdictions); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and 
Institutional Investors, UCLA Sch. of L., Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-
20 (Sept. 2005) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=796227 (warning 
of the dangers of greater institutional investor activism, arguing that such 
investors are motivated by narrow interests that may undermine passive 
investors and compromise the effectiveness of the board to make decisions in 
the best interest of the firm); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited 
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006) (petitioning for 
greater prudence before extending the shareholder franchise, defending why 
only shareholders have voting rights and then defending why such voting 
rights are so limited); See Bainbridge 2006, supra note 105 (responding to 
Lucian A. Bebchuk's article entitled: The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power, rejecting Bebchuk’s proposals for allowing shareholders to have 
greater voting power so that they can change a firm’s basic corporate 
governance arrangements, defending existing regime of limited shareholder 
voting rights). 
136 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 233-35. 
137 Id. at 235. 
138 Id. at 234-35. 
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He argues that director primacy satisfies this objective by 
ensuring that corporate governance abides by the shareholder 
wealth maximization norm.139 He warns that shareholder primacy 
urges policy-makers to grant shareholders additional powers to 
exercise direct control over the corporation, but this will prove to 
be detrimental to the shareholder class as a whole.140 This is 
because special interests (institutional investors), which have 
consolidated power within the shareholder class, will exploit 
these additional powers at the expense of weaker shareholders.141  
Within the existing corporate governance order, 
Bainbridge suggests that shareholders are happy to be rationally 
apathetic because it is easier to exit than it is to fight.142 He 
contends that this is true even for institutional investors because 
of: 1) the costs of monitoring corporate activities and engaging in 
activism; 2) the frequency of free riding on such efforts; and 3) the 
marginal gains that result from such activism.143 Bainbridge 
asserts that the apathy of shareholders is normally a good thing 
because when institutional investors are motivated to interfere 
with corporate governance, they usually do so in order to 
champion their narrow interests which undermine shareholders’ 
interests as a whole and hamper the ability of directors to make 
decisions in the best interest of the firm.144 
There are a number of existing vehicles for shareholder 
activism including: 1) exit; 2) proxy contests; 3) withholding votes 
in director elections; 4) shareholder proposals; and 5) private 
negotiations between institutional investors and corporate 
management. Bainbridge asserts that shareholder primacy 
advocates view these vehicles as inadequate and that they 
promote expansion of the shareholder franchise by: 1) reforming 
the director nomination process; 2) reforming the mechanics of 
the voting process; and 3) expanding the substance of what 
shareholders can vote upon.145 Bainbridge flatly rejects that the 
expansion of shareholder voting rights would be prudent, 
reinforcing his main argument which calls for adherence to the 
status quo. Ultimately, he reminds his reader that one should not 
take lightly the dangers of interfering with board authority for 
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209-22. 
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the sake of greater accountability because “the preservation of 
managerial discretion should always be [the] default 
presumption.”146 
The biggest test for the canonization of director primacy is 
whether it is simply a semantic technique to maintain the defense 
of the professional bureaucracy that runs the corporation or 
whether the function of the board can be established as changing. 
If the behavior of “managers” (excluding directors) is what 
shareholder primacy advocates are up in arms about, and if 
directors are really the true champions of the whole of the 
shareholder class, then director primacy might be the “Third 
Way” of corporate governance. However, if the distinction 
between managerialism and director primacy cannot stand the 
test of the Devil’s Advocate, and directors cannot be established 
to be different than “managers,” this theory will fail to be 
convincing as a new path for corporate governance.  
For this reason, the stakes are at their highest when 
Bainbridge makes the case for the distinction between directors 
and managers in the post-Enron function of the American board 
of directors. Although Bainbridge argues that director 
empowerment started much earlier than the enactment of SOX147 
and other amendments to the listing requirements of various 
American stock exchanges, his position is that these legal changes 
have finally tipped the scales as directors are now starting to 
enjoy enough freedom from executive officers to be able to 
independently exercise authority over the corporation.148  
Bainbridge’s narrative of the shift from managerialism to 
director primacy is persuasive to read. He discusses the director’s 
evolving role from being the rubber stamps of CEOs to 
potentially having a legitimate monitoring function.149 He 
explains how starting in the 1970s, the pressure mounted to 
improve what was seen at that time as the board’s failure to rein 
in the excesses of executive officers and improve management’s 
performance.150 From this arose the recognition of the important 
role that independent directors could play within the corporate 
governance structure. He explains how post-Enron developments 
                                                          
146 Id. at 235. 
147  Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 30, 2002, available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ204/content-detail.html. 
148BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 198-200. 
149 Id. at 198-200. 
150 See, e.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
CORPORATION (1976). 
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have bolstered a director’s ability to police managers for 
shareholders by: 1) improving best-practice norms; 2) 
strengthening the threats to a director’s reputation for turning a 
blind eye to managers running roughshod over shareholder 
interests; 3) increasing judicial pressure for better information 
flow from management to directors; and 4) increasing 
requirements for more independent directors on boards.151  
Bainbridge’s argument is weaker when he fails to provide 
strong empirical evidence that these changes are creating 
“strong, active independent directors with little tolerance for 
negligence or culpable conduct.”152 Again, there is little 
empirical evidence to support his claims that this functional shift 
is, in fact, occurring.153 In the end, Bainbridge sounds like E. 
Merrick Dodd, Jr. who, in his reply to Adolf A. Berle, Jr., merely 
employed optimism for the new generation of managers.154 They 
are both very optimistic about the potential of a bureaucratic 
revolution, an event which would transform the ruling fiats of the 
great American corporations into group decision making centers 
and, thereby, helping manage the economy in a manner that is 
more beneficial to society.155 Both arguments are inspiring, but 
also lack substance and amount to no more than corporate 
futurism.  
In the end, even in his best argument for director primacy 
to date, Bainbridge makes quite a weak statement arguing that 
the “real world practice” of directors is still “supine,” but is 
“closer to the director primacy model than it was in earlier 
periods.”156 One must respect Bainbridge’s candor on this point 
but it does lay bare what might be the dangerously un-secret 
weakness of the otherwise invulnerable Siegfried-like 
argument.157 
                                                          
151 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 176-87. 
152 Id. at 198. 
153 Id. 
154 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Mangers Trustees?, 45 
HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1146, 1148, 1151-53, 1165-67 (1932). 
155 Id. at 1148. 
156 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 200. 
157 For the story of dragon-slayer Siegfried, which inspired Richard 
Wagner’s “Der Ring des Nibelungen,” see SONG OF THE NIBELUNGS: A 
VERSE TRANSLATION FROM THE MIDDLE HIGH GERMAN NIBELUNGENLIED 
(Frank G. Ryder trans., 1962).  
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VII. Reflections on the Battle for Delaware: Form or Substance? 
Strine was obviously opposed to more federal meddling 
within Delaware’s national corporate law regime and Bainbridge 
was clearly a defender of the Delaware status quo. But by 
encouraging greater federalization of corporate law, Bebchuk 
appeared willing to risk Delaware’s caucus and the American 
corporate law status quo in order to gain greater shareholder 
engagement. Although Bebchuk did not appear to want to open 
the Delaware arrangement to the flood of other interests that 
might follow the federal government into the internal affairs of 
the corporation, he was willing to risk it.  
In The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, Bebchuk 
used empirical evidence to establish that the power between 
directors and shareholders of larger American corporations with 
dispersed ownership was too unbalanced, as it blocked 
shareholders from maximizing shareholder value when 
management refused to cooperate.158 Bebchuk argued that 
allowing shareholders to be directly involved in corporate 
decision making would enhance corporate governance by 
motivating management to be more cooperative because 
shareholders had the power to directly intervene. With respect to 
the reformation process, Bebchuk predictably stated that it 
should be through federal intervention.159 
Bebchuk’s writing indicated that he did not want to open 
the floodgates beyond shareholders and managers to other 
interests that influenced the federal government.160 If he did not 
want these populous interests to start meddling in the internal 
affairs of the corporation, what was he doing? Doubtless, he was 
familiar with Roe’s position on the matter, so maybe he: 1) did 
not believe that his petition for federal involvement seriously 
threatened the Delaware caucus; 2) did not care if the Delaware 
caucus was threatened (if managers monopolized it); or 3) maybe 
he was using the Cary card as leverage to up the stakes and, 
perhaps, make Delaware concede without federal intervention. 
Regardless, the Cary card caused different reactions which were 
interesting to observe. In response to Bebchuk’s proposal, Strine 
suggested that the traditionalist investor would prefer the status 
quo to what Bebchuk proposed.161 This was because the 
                                                          
158 Bebchuk, supra note 64.  
159 Id. at 874.  
160 See Bebchuk, supra note 64. 
161 Strine, supra note 64, at 1775. 
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traditionalist investor would fear that Bebchuk’s proposal might 
subvert their interests by compromising managerial authority.162 
If managerial authority was undermined, institutional 
intermediaries with no interests to serve but their own would 
further compromise the corporate governance structure. Strine 
suggested that the traditionalist investor would thus “leave 
things where they [stood] even if the status quo [was] not 
ideal.”163 But Strine still entertained Bebchuk’s proposal (with 
some slight reframing) in order to be “open-minded” to the 
idea that the traditionalist investor “might embrace reform that 
[was] consistent with Bebchuk’s call for greater managerial 
accountability.”164 Strine bit Bebchuk’s bait, but why? The 
answer came when Strine asserted: “Therefore, if reform 
attractive to the traditionalist is to come, it must emanate from 
state policymakers who can implement a reform that coheres 
with an overall approach to corporate law.”165 Strine 
longwindedly made this argument but he reinforced his key 
point: whatever amendments needed to be made, Delaware and 
not the federal government needed to make them.166  
Strine offered hope to Bebchuk that there might be 
flexibility on the issue of shareholder empowerment but 
Delaware needed to be the innovator, not the federal government, 
because state competition must be preserved. It made sense that, 
if the choice was between Delaware (form) and the status quo 
(substance), Strine would advocate sacrificing some substance 
and managerial power and protect Delaware’s de facto 
preeminence. If this situation was to arise it would be ideal for 
Bebchuk because it would maintain Delaware’s influence while 
increasing shareholder influence within the political caucus.  
As one might expect, Bainbridge opposed Bebchuk’s 
proposal by employing the race-to-the-top argument.167 He 
argued that existing corporate law was optimal because it 
survived the competitive forces of the charter market.168 He then 
made his director primacy argument defending why this model 
was the appropriate model to protect shareholder interests.169 He 
concluded that, since director primacy was the superior model 
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and since Delaware’s default rules already enshrined director 
primacy, no reform was necessary.170 The bottom line was that 
Bainbridge rejected any changes to the form or the substance of 
Delaware’s law and lawmaking capacity.  
In sum, within the battle over corporate governance, there 
appears to be an impasse which allows managers to have the 
luxury of a heavy hand in shaping its evolution. Bebchuk, 
champion of the shareholder and, to a lesser degree, of Cary, is 
unhappy with this state of affairs and is petitioning federal 
intervention to shake things up. Strine, champion of Winter and, 
to a lesser degree, managerialism, is happy with Delaware’s 
position as the manufacturer of “national” corporate law but 
appears willing to negotiate with Bebchuk’s position. And 
Bainbridge is the warrior of the Delaware status quo and is 
deeply entrenched in his position. Or is he? For, although he 
initially attacked creeping federalism, he now uses the provision 
of SOX and the amendments to listing requirements to support 
his director primacy argument.171 This might suggest that his 
race-to-the-top argument gives way at times to pragmatism, as 
does Strine’s defense of the Delaware status quo. 
VIII. Conclusions 
The power to influence the development of the corporate 
charter within the Delaware caucus is the power to potentially 
influence Granovetter’s actual and ongoing social networks 
inside and outside of the corporation and, hence, underscore its 
embeddedness. The above narrative highlights the levels of 
contention between managers and shareholders for control over 
future reforms. To date, managers have dominated the caucus 
marginalizing efforts by shareholder advocates who want other 
shareholders to have greater direct participation within 
America’s corporate governance structures. Historically, the 
Delaware caucus has weathered tremendous economic 
transformations remaining relatively unchanged when compared 
to the reforms Britain and Australia took over the last twenty-
five years.172 Delaware has been less prone to amendment partly 
because its corporate law regime is regarded to be the result of an 
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171 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 64, at 176-87. 
172 For more on this, see Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Show and Tell: 
Lessons From International Statutory Regimes, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 823 
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innovative and inspirational regulatory lab which harnesses the 
power of state competition.173  
With a view to the still-open questions regarding state 
competition, Bebchuk petitioned for more federal intervention, 
challenging whether the market for charters inspires the optimal 
lawmaking which is claimed to exist. He called for greater power-
sharing between the federal and state governments in this 
process, hoping this would crack open the Delaware caucus and 
result in more direct shareholder influence over corporate 
decision making. In response to Bebchuk, Vice Chancellor Strine 
argued that greater power-sharing with the federal government 
would be a mistake because Delaware’s regulatory machinery 
was not influenced by managers to a degree that would prevent 
greater shareholder participation within corporate governance (if 
such reforms were what shareholders really wanted and what 
American corporate governance really needed). Meanwhile, this 
dialogue between two highly regarded and influential discourse 
participants – the Vice Chancellor of Delaware’s Court of 
Chancery and America’s top legal academic advocate of 
shareholder empowerment – has been unsettling to the avid 
champions of Delaware’s present status quo.  
Confidence in Delaware, like that heralded by Professor 
Bainbridge, has made American corporate observers less likely to 
look beyond national borders for inspiration in corporate reforms 
and also less likely to assume that such reforms are necessary.174 
In this way, the charter competition argument has been very 
successful at maintaining a status quo in which corporate 
managers have greater control over corporate governance policy 
than similar managers have in either Britain or Australia – 
countries that have both seen an increase in the participatory 
rights of shareholders.175 However, American corporate 
governance can be said to be in transition as there has clearly 
been a shift of power away from the Delaware caucus in response 
to its “modest and incremental” approach to reform.176 Starting 
with the post-scandal regulatory responses (such as SOX), the 
federal government has been more willing to interfere with the 
presumed preeminence of the charter market.177 This may prove 
to be the harbinger of the demise of the monopoly which 
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Delaware has enjoyed for the past century,178 providing new 
opportunities to increase the participatory rights of shareholders. 
Today, corporate managers are under attack for having 
failed to provide for adequate monitoring and oversight of their 
firms’ investments before the Credit Crisis. The situation has 
called into question the balance between managerial authority 
and managerial accountability. Eyes are on the capacity of state 
level legal mechanisms (in particular Delaware) to deal with these 
corporate governance failures.179 Meanwhile, federal reforms 
(such as “say on pay” and other shareholder empowerment 
initiatives) have either been established,180 or are in the works.181 
Such federal interventions demonstrate a continued willingness to 
intercede in corporate regulatory development at the state level.  
It is difficult to foretell the long-term impact of such 
federal interventions in the area of corporate governance. If this 
attitude prevailed, the federal government would likely face 
increased pressures from a number of interest groups – not just 
shareholder groups – pushing for further corporate governance 
reform. But is this a Pandora’s Box in the making? Alternatively, 
Delaware may want to answer to the sort of pressures that 
prompted the federal government’s activity in the first place. It 
seems that, either way, more shareholder participation rights in 
American corporate governance is a likely outcome.  
The likelihood of such an outcome brings this argument 
full circle. As noted in the beginning, the British corporate 
governance expert Simon Deakin observed how Polanyi’s double 
movement had in recent times been off-set to favor market 
interests to the detriment of society, driven predominantly by the 
power exercised by investors in this era of financialization. Now, 
with the regulatory responses against the crisis still forthcoming, 
one of the questions arising out of the foregoing is whether 
increases in shareholder participatory rights are likely to further 
increase the movement toward the financialization of the firm in 
the American context? While only a few years ago we would have 
found it hard to see how it would not, the current crisis and the 
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emerging regulatory responses might suggest otherwise.182 This 
uncertainty hints at the political stakes in the Delaware debate 
and beyond.  
Of course, the issue is more complex. Greater shareholder 
participation may not be a bad thing. As Berle argued in response 
to Dodd in the classical American debate over managerialism, 
although shareholder empowerment may not be an adequate 
solution to managerial opportunism, enforcement of property 
rights is the only legal tool available to safeguard against it.183 But 
how much has changed almost eighty years later? In 1932, Berle 
was hopeful that new theories in sociology would soon provide 
the support for legal innovations which would better regulate 
corporate governance184 . . . the law is still waiting. 
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